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We examine the formation of International Environmental Agreements (IEAs) 
modelled as a two-stage non cooperative game. Following Barrett (1994), Finus 
(2001) and Diamantoudi & al. (2006) and filling out their approach, we analyse 
the level of cooperation that can be reach when countries’ strategies are 
complementary. We find that when strategies exhibit weak complementarities, 
the unique stable agreement can consist of half the countries involved in the 
negotiation and thus, without any form of commitment, linkage or transfers 
between countries. These results, established analytically, strongly contrast with 
those of the previous authors and are a lot more optimistic. Nonetheless, even if 
the incentives to free-ride are less strong, we do not observe the formation of the 
“grand” coalition: not all the countries sign the agreement. We also provide 
some results of comparative static. We analyse, for example, the level of 
cooperation which only depends on the number of countries concerned with the 
problem of climate change and on the perception they have of its seriousness. 
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1.  Introduction 
 
The problem of climate change belongs to the class of global environmental problems in the 
sense that damages a country bears, do not depend on its own emissions but on aggregate 
emissions: every country emits greenhouse gases into the atmosphere and every country will 
be affected by the climate change caused by the accumulation of these gases. Even if the 
impacts of global warming can be sustained differently by each country, environmental 
changes only depend on world emissions. The main reasons why the control of greenhouse 
gas emissions (afterwards GHG emissions) now covers an international dimension are the 
following: (i) once emitted, GHG concentrations become quickly and rather uniform around 
the world, (ii) as a consequence of trade globalization of these last 50 years, the sources of 
pollution come from economic activities which are less and less geographically bounded and 
(iii) national environmental policies are increasingly interdependent. Consequently, the 
economic regulation of the environment has to be undertaken at an international level
2. 
Empirical observations from the last twenty years strongly support this claim. Taking into 
account the reality of global warming and of the responsibility of human activities on climate 
imbalances, some governments have begun environmental policies to curb their GHG 
emissions. The Kyoto Protocol, in effect since 2005, is the most recent example of an 
international coordination to take action in the matter of climate change. 
 
However, the main source of failure of the international system is States’ sovereignty. In our 
realm, there is no supranational authority to enforce arrangements between countries. When 
environmental problems are global, involving all countries, each of them has to decide 
voluntarily to provide or not the public good ‘Environment’, i.e to reduce its GHG emissions. 
It also means that International Environmental Agreements (IEA) have to be self-enforcing in 
the sense that they are immune to deviation by the countries involved. Theoretical models 
developed until recently try to explain the emergence of cooperation between countries when 
they are subject to strong environmental externalities. An important result of this literature is 
that cooperation emerges even in a non-cooperative setting (Carraro & Siniscalco, 1991; 
Barrett, 1994; Finus & Rundshagen, 1998; Diamantoudi & al., 2006 among others). These 
results are based on non-cooperative game theory and more particularly on endogenous 
coalitions’ formation theory with spillovers. Game theory is particularly appropriate to 
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account for strategic interdependence between agents. In our framework, the literature shows 
that there exists a stable coalition, as defined in industrial organization by D’Aspremont & al. 
(1983) and extended to IEA (Barrett, 1994; Bauer, 1992; Hoel, 1992). In other words, a subset 
of countries involved in the negotiation find beneficial to jointly diminish their emissions, 
meaning that it is in their self-interest; the agreement is self-enforcing. However the 
equilibrium number of signatories is in general rather small with respect to the number of 
countries concerned with the environmental problem. No more than four countries will form 
the stable coalition without regard on the number of countries involved in the negotiation 
(Diamantoudi et al., 2006). Hence, the impacts of the actions undertaken remain limited and 
do not allow restoring the global optimum.  
 
Actually it turns out that the robustness of this result on the emergence of environmental 
cooperation without any trigger or stick mechanisms is based on one assumption which 
appears in most of the studies on international environment but is seldom discussed: the 
pattern of interdependence among countries. This latter is described by the slope of the best-
reply functions, and it is fundamental for understanding the effectiveness of cooperative and 
non-cooperative emission control (Carraro and Siniscalco, 1991)
3. Whereas they are derived 
from the most general form of the payoff function used by the literature on IEAs, the results 
discussed above suppose that countries’ strategy are substitutable
4.  
 
In this paper we are looking for what happens when strategies become complementary. This 
assumption means that, if a country increases its emissions, the others will have a positive 
incentive to do the same. This idea is meaningful if we look at the current economies of 
developed counties and their political and trade interconnections. The formation of free trade 
areas (regionalization) in Europe, Asia or America have led to a boom of trade between 
countries belonging to these blocks. Obviously, if the United-States falls in a recessionary 
period tomorrow, the level of activities of its trade partners will fall as well.  
 
                                                 
4 Carraro and Siniscalco (1991) already underlined this idea, but confined their study to the 
case where the slope of the best-reply functions are negative. They find that the more negative 
it is, the larger the incentive to deviate from any coalition.  
 
4 For an overview of assumptions and results of game theoretical analyses of IEAs see Finus 
(2001 and 2003a).   4
Going further into prior findings, we analyse in this paper the level of cooperation that can be 
reach when countries’ strategies are complementary. The countries, which are the decision-
making units, are interdependent in the sense that their economic activities are more and more 
connected and integrated. The study of coalition formation under strategic complementarities 
has already provided some interesting results in considering the case of the spread of catalytic 
converters in automobiles (Heal, 1993; Barrett, 2003). Under discrete policy choices and 
multiplicity of equilibria, these authors find that the challenge for countries concerned with 
the protection of the environment is not anymore how to sustain full cooperation? but rather 
how to get to the preferred equilibrium? In other words, the existence of reinforcement effects 
between countries’ strategies turns the initial preoccupation into a coordination problem. 
Therefore, with a threshold constraint, an IEA may help to coordinate States’ behaviour such 
that the welfare-superior equilibrium is sustained.  
 
What distinguish our findings to previous is that, we do not consider perfect 
complementarities between countries. In the tradition of the first models, the question always 
is: how many countries will sign the agreement? Thereby, in this paper, we choose to consider 
the problem of international pollution control in a similar way to Diamantoudi & al. (2006) 
with quadratic benefit and damage functions. One main difference is the specific functional 
forms which exhibits strategic complementarities. So, we study the incentives schemes of 
sovereign countries which sign a treaty. The equilibrium number of countries participating in 
an IEA is derived by applying the internal and external stability concept borrowed from the 
oligopoly literature. We show that, under these assumptions, cooperation is largely greater. 
Nonetheless, all the results depend on the number of countries involved in the negotiation and 
their perception of environmental damages with respect to the benefits of their GHG 
emissions. Moreover, even if an agreement will always be signed, it will never be the “grand 
coalition”. 
 
The paper is organised as follow. In section 2, the fundamental functions and assumptions of 
the game are defined. In the third section, we derive the non-cooperative and the full 
cooperative outcomes. These solutions are used as a benchmark to analyse signatories’ and 
non-signatories’ behaviour. Finally, we establish analytically the size of the stable agreement, 
i.e. the level of cooperation that can be reached by the countries under strategic 
complementarities. The last section concludes. The proofs of all results are given in the 
appendix.   5
 
2.  Fundamental functions and assumptions of the emission game  
 
We consider n symmetric countries with N = {1, ..., n}. Linked to economic activities, each of 
them emits greenhouse gases (GHGs),  0 ≥ i x , that mix uniformly in the atmosphere. In its 
most general form, the payoff function of country i, i f , is expressed as the difference 
between the benefits of emissions,  ) ( i i x B , and the damages linked to global emissions, 
∑ ∈ ) ( i N i i x D . Then, i f  can be written: 
∑ − = jj i i i i x D x B f ) ( ) ( ,  N j i ∈ ∀ , . 
  
Emissions are viewed as an output of the production and consumption of goods from which 
benefits are derived, while the payoff function describes the welfare implication from 
emissions at an aggregate level. Even if the impacts of global warming can be supported 
differently by each country, environmental changes only depend on world emissions. Hence, 
the damage function of the country under consideration does not depend on its own 
contribution but rather on the sum of the emission levels supplied by all countries. So, 
emissions in a country generate an externality causing environmental damage in this country 
but also in the other countries. 
 
Since the countries are assumed to be identical, we drop the subscripts from the functions. 
Moreover, we will note x,  y and z respectively the emission level of the country under 
consideration, the aggregate emission level of the (n – 1) other countries, and the global 
emission level, i.e., z = x + y.  
We will assume that the benefit function is increasing in the level of emissions, i.e. 
0 ) ( ' > i x B . Similarly, given that emissions disperse uniformly in the atmosphere, the 
damage function is supposed to increase in the global emissions z, i.e. 0 ) ( ' > ⋅ D over R+ .  
 
For each country, we assume hereafter the following specific benefit and damage functions:  
2 / 1 ) 1 ( ) ( − = x b x B , with b a positive benefit parameter, and 
   2 / 1 ) ( ) ( y x c y x D + = + , with c a positive cost parameter. 
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In the current literature parameters b and c are usually introduce to analyse the relative impact 
of cost of emissions compared to benefit. Parameter b is often interpreted as an opportunity 
cost of abatement whereas in Endres (1997) parameter c is interpreted as the environmental 
awareness of the society of a country. Particular attention will be given to the effect of a 
change in these parameters on the success and stability of an IEA.  
Each of these functions is increasing in the individual emission level but at a decreasing rate. 
We assume a concave damage function because when damages only depend on aggregate 
emissions, it’s the only way for payoff functions to exhibit strategic complementarities. 
For a country, the form of the payoff function is then:  
2 / 1 2 / 1 ) ( ) 1 ( ) , ( y x c x b y x f + − − = , with 1 ≤ x ≤ K, 
 
With K accounting for a capacity constraint. It means that a country cannot produce infinitely 
GHG’s emissions or that its economic activities are bounded. Similarly, notice that our 
function set forth a lower bound on emissions in the sense that a country cannot reduce its 
economic activities under some level.  
In the following, each country is supposed to maximise its payoff function to determine its 
level of emissions. We first consider the non-cooperative and the full cooperative cases. They 
are next used as a benchmark to study the endogenous formation of an environmental 
agreement.  
 
3.  The non-cooperative and full cooperative outcomes 
 
3.1. The pure non cooperative case 
 
In the pure non-cooperative case each country chooses its emission level taking the other 
countries’ emission as given: 
    2 / 1 2 / 1
0 ) ( ) 1 ( ) , ( y x c x b y x f Max x + − − = ≥ . 
















In what follows,  b c / = γ   is defined as the cost/benefit ratio of GHG emissions. It 
represents the perception that countries have of environmental damages in comparison with   7
the benefits they obtain from their emissions. Given the assumption of identical countries, 
x n y ) 1 ( − = . The emission levels for a country and the global emissions in the non-
cooperative case are respectively: 
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Given equilibrium emission levels, the shape of the payoff function of a country in the non-
cooperative case is: 
2 / 1 2













From our assumptions on the payoff functions and the solutions of the maximisation problem, 
we can establish a preliminary result.  
 
Result 1:  
Under our assumptions, countries’ strategies exhibit weak complementarities. It follows that: 
(i)  Individual and aggregate equilibrium emissions levels,  nc x  and  nc z  are increasing 
in n and decreasing in γ; 
(ii) The equilibrium payoff of each country is decreasing in n and increasing in γ until 
2 / 1 ) 1 2 ( − = n γ ; beyond it decreases in γ. 
 
When countries’ strategies exhibit complementarities it means that, if a country increases its 
levels of production and consumption and thus its level of emissions, the others have a 
positive incentive to do the same. Hence, the marginal utility a country gets from its emissions 
is increasing in the level of emissions of the other countries.  
Moreover, when considering countries as trade partners, the larger is n, the more a country 
will increase its trade relationships and thus its economic activities. However it also means 
that the level of emissions of each country will be increasing in the number of countries 
involved. As a result of the non-cooperative case, the larger is the number of countries 
concerned with the environmental problem, the greater the individual and aggregate   8
equilibrium emissions levels and the higher the marginal utility a country derived from its 
emissions. This result is immediately linked to strategic complementarities between countries.  
Furthermore, there is nothing new in saying that the more the damages are perceived seriously 
compared to the benefits of emissions, the lower the equilibrium emission level of a country. 
In other words, the marginal utility of emissions of each country is decreasing in the 
cost/benefit ratio. Therefore, referring to the second point of result 1, as soon as the 
perception of damages is not too strong ( γ γ < ), equilibrium payoffs are increasing in the 
perception of damages. The existence of γ restrains the emission level of each country and 
then the importance of externalities. The larger is γ , the more the levels of emissions are 
contained and the higher the equilibrium payoffs. Beyond the threshold γ , what happens is 
that damages are perceived so seriously that all countries emit as less as possible and cannot 
reduce their emission level as much as in the prior case. Hence, the abatement effort does not 
suffice to balance the importance of the externalities. Yet countries have no choice except to 
suffer the losses linked to environmental damages without having a real impact on it. 
 
Finally the last point is linked to the fact that the game is a game with negative externality, 
and countries, when choosing their emission level, do not take into account the impact of their 
choice on the other countries. This phenomenon is amplified by the fact that countries’ 
strategies are complementary: if a country increases its emissions, the others have an 
incentive to increase their own emissions. So, at the Nash equilibrium there is an increasing 
incentive to have greater emissions. Thus, the larger is n, the greater are the environmental 
externalities and the lower are the equilibrium utilities. In the same way, the larger is n, the 
higher will be the global emissions and the more severe the environmental problem. In this 
setting, countries should be more incline to cooperate. Before studying endogenous 
cooperation between countries, we now present what happens in the full cooperative case. In 
other words, we analyse the situation when each country takes into account the negative 
externality it imposes upon other countries. 
 
3.2. The full cooperative case 
 
In the full cooperative case, we assume that the whole countries maximize their joint payoff. 
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Given equilibrium emission levels, the shape of the payoff function for each country in the 
full cooperative case is: 
2 / 1 2 ) 1 ( − − = γ n b fc . 
As in the non-cooperative case, we establish the same kind of comparative static results when 
all countries cooperate (result 2) and then we compare the equilibrium emission levels and 
equilibrium payoffs with the non-cooperative outcomes (result 3). 
 
Result 2: 
In the full cooperative case, we find that: 
(i) Individual equilibrium emission level,  c x   is decreasing in n whereas aggregate 
equilibrium emission level,  c z  is increasing in n; 
(ii) Individual and aggregate equilibrium emission levels,  c x  and  c z are decreasing in γ; 
(iii) The equilibrium payoff of each country is decreasing in n and in γ. 
 
Under our assumptions we find that when all countries cooperate, individual emission levels 
are decreasing in n. This observation is linked to the fact that the game is of negative 
externalities. When cooperating, countries take into account the negative impact of their 
emissions on the other countries. The larger is n, the larger is the scope of emissions and the 
lower will be the individual emissions. In other words, countries have to take into account n 
times the environmental damages linked with their emissions instead of one time. 
Nonetheless, global emissions keep on increasing in the number of countries concerned with 
the environmental problem. Consequently, equilibrium payoffs are decreasing in n. However,   10
contrary to the non-cooperative case, it is because abatement efforts are increasing in the 
number of countries concerned with the environmental problem. 
 
As previously individual and aggregate emission levels are decreasing in the cost/benefit 
ratio, i.e. the stronger is the perception of the seriousness of the environmental damages, the 
more countries will reduce their individual emission level. The payoff of full cooperation is 
decreasing in γ because countries, in cooperating, do their maximum to reduce their impact on 
the environment. The stronger is their perception of the damages compared with the benefits 
of emissions, the lower is their utility. 
 
Before contrasting emission levels and payoffs under full cooperation with the non-
cooperative outcome, we define the indexes I1 and I2. The first one corresponds to the relative 
difference between global emissions in the Nash equilibrium and in the social optimum. It 
defines, in relative terms, the ‘degree of externality’ (Finus, 2001). The latter index states the 































We can assess the three following points: 
(i)  Individual and aggregate equilibrium emission levels under full cooperation,  c x  
and  c z are such that  nc c x x <  and  nc c z z < ; 
(ii)  Equilibrium payoffs are such that  nc c f f >  ; 
(iii)  I1 is increasing in n and decreasing in γ whereas we find the reverse result for I2. 
 
We find the standard results of games exhibiting negative externalities: countries are better off 
under full cooperation than in the non-cooperative setting. As each country takes into account 
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in all cases are of the same sign. 
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the negative impact of its emissions on the others, the country reduces its individual emission 
with respect to the non-cooperative outcome. Globally, aggregate emissions also fall. Each 
wins of such a strategy. 
The last point means that, the larger the number of countries which suffer from the global 
externality and the lower the cost/benefit ratio of emissions, the more important it is to reach a 
cooperative agreement. The first result is characteristic of the provision of public goods. The 
latter indicates that emission reduction is particularly attractive if the perception of damages is 
not to strong with respect to the benefits of emissions. In interpreting parameter b as the 
opportunity cost of abatement, the bigger is b relative to environmental costs (γ is low) the 
higher will be the emissions in the non-cooperative outcome and the more inefficient will be 
the situation from the global society’s point of view. In contrast, if environmental damages 
are very high, only moderate emission reductions are advisable from a global perspective. 
Cooperation is then less attractive because individual emissions are already as low as 
possible. Hence, only moderate emission reductions can be reached.  
Relatively to the second index, gains linked to cooperation are higher, the number of countries 
concerned with the environmental problem is not too large and the stronger is the perception 
of damages. In other words, linked to the cost/benefit ratio, cooperation will pay less if 
opportunity costs of abatement are high or environmental awareness is low (γ is low). Hence, 
the higher will be the ‘degree of externality’ the lower will be the relative difference in terms 
of payoffs (individual actions of abatement are taken more easily when the ‘degree of 
externality’ is increasing). 
 
For any n and γ, the full cooperative outcome is the best possible cooperative solution. 
However, in the realm of one stage game with simultaneous play, each country has an 
incentive to take advantage of the agreement and to free ride on the emission reduction 
achieved by the countries complying with the agreement. Thereby each country earns a lot 
more in deviating unilaterally, i.e. it benefits of a better environment without paying the cost.  
In what follows we consider the two-stage framework. In a first step each country decides to 
be a signatory or a non-signatory. In a second step, they play the emission game. In doing so, 
the incentive to free ride on the coalition’s cooperating efforts may be offset by the 
adjustment of the coalition’s emissions upon a member’s deviation.   
 
4.  The endogenous coalition formation game 
   12
In this section, we analyse the emergence of an IEA as the equilibrium of a two-stage game. 
In the first stage, countries choose independently and simultaneously whether to join an 
agreement or to remain a non-signatory. Given the option chosen in the first stage, signatories 
and non-signatories then decide in a second stage of their emission levels. Hence we restrict 
our attention to the formation of only one, non-trivial
6, coalition. It’s assumed that countries 
forming an IEA coordinate their policies by jointly maximising the aggregate welfare of the 
coalition and given the behaviour of non-signatories. Given the assumption of symmetric 
countries, we assume that signatories agree on a symmetric abatement scheme which implies 
equal payoffs. In contrast, each non-signatory behaves non-cooperatively and chooses its 
emission level independently, i.e., given the behaviour of signatories and the behaviour of the 
other non-signatories. Let N S ⊂ the set of countries that sign an agreement and N\S the set of 
those who do not. We note   the size of the coalition,   the emission level of a 
signatory while the total emission generated by the coalition is  . Similarly each non-
signatory country emits   yielding a total emission level  . Finally, we 
assume that players choose their strategies in both stages simultaneously
7.  
The next two sub-sections solve the two-stage game by backward induction. The equilibrium 
emission levels of the second stage are determined first, given the number of signatories, s. 
 
4.1. Signatory and non-signatory behaviours in the emission game 
 
Signatories are assumed to act collectively rather than independently. Particularly, they 
choose the emission level that maximises their aggregate payoff. Notice that, in that case, the 
damages are a function of both signatories’ emissions and non-signatories’ emissions. 
Formally, signatories solve the following maximization problem: 
( ) 2 / 1 2 / 1
0 ) ) ( ( ) 1 ( ns s s xs x s n sx c x b s Max − + − − ≥ . 
















                                                 
6 A non-trivial coalition is a coalition of at least two members. 
7 This assumption is referred as the Nash-Cournot assumption and is in line with the works of 
Carraro and Siniscalco, 1991; Bauer, 1992; Hoel, 1992. For an alternative assumption, see 
Barrett 1994 and Finus, 2001. 
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To determine completely the emission level of the coalition with respect to its size, we have to 
solve the maximisation problem of a non-signatory. 
A non-signatory choose its own emission level, xi, given the emission levels of the s 
signatories and of the (n – s - 1) other non-signatories. Formally, a non-signatory solves the 
following problem: 
( )
2 / 1 2 / 1
0 ) ) 1 ( ( ) 1 ( i ns s i xi x x s n sx c x b s Max + − − + − − ≥ . 
The necessary condition leads to the following best response function: 
1
) 1 (
) , ( 2
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This reaction function is a function of both the emission levels of the signatories and of the 
other non-signatories. By symmetry, all non-signatories will play the same equilibrium 
emission level. So, we can establish the emission level of a non-signatory, xns, as a function of 
the emission level of the coalition: 














The intersection of both best-response functions leads to the following equilibrium emission 
levels, respectively of a signatory and of a non-signatory: 
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For any n, s ≥ 1 and γ the equilibrium emission levels are positive and belong to the feasible 
action set before-defined. To determine the welfare levels of signatories and non-signatories   14
for any given s, we substitute the equilibrium emission levels  s x ,  ns x  and  T z  into the 
corresponding payoff functions. The shapes of the payoff functions, respectively of a 
signatory and of a non-signatory, are: 
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From these last equilibrium outcomes, we can establish the following result: 
 
Result 4: 
The analysis of the outcomes of the second-stage emission game leads to the following points: 
(i)  For any s and n, emission level of a signatory will always be below the emission 
level of a non-signatory, but both reduce their emissions compared with the non-
cooperative outcome;  
(ii)  The payoff of a signatory is always below the one of a non-signatory:  ns s f f < , 
but the difference is decreasing in the number of cooperating countries; 
(iii)  The larger is the coalition s, the lower the individual emission levels,  s x and  ns x , 
and so, the lower the global emissions  T z ; 
(iv)  Both type of payoff function are increasing in the number of signatories, s. 
 
To understand this result, notice that we are in a mid-case between non-cooperation and full 
cooperation. The full-cooperative and the pure non-cooperative outcomes are special cases of 
the outcomes with endogenous formation of an agreement. That is, when s = n, the problem 
reduces to the full-cooperative solution ( c s x x =  and  c s z z = ), while when s = 1, it 
reduces to the pure non-cooperative solution ( nc s x x =  and  nc s z z = ). 
The fact that a signatory pollutes less in term of GHG emissions than a non-signatory is not 
new when cooperation is partial. Cooperation aims at this result. Though, and contrary to a 
non-signatory, a country which signs the agreement only takes into account the negative 
externality the others signatories bear because of its emissions. A more remarkable thing 
relative to the non-cooperative outcome is that, the cooperation between a subgroup of   15
countries also leads the non-signatories to reduce their emission levels. The free-riding 
phenomenon thus takes a different form as postulated before in the literature: instead of 
canceling the efforts provided by the cooperating countries, a country which free-rides will 
abate its emissions but less than a signatory. When payoffs exhibit strategic 
complementarities, a signatory reduces more its GHG emissions than a non-signatory; and the 
larger is the number of signatories, the higher the individual abatement efforts of both type of 
country. Though, the larger is s, the lower the global emissions.  
The second point is a consequence of the first one. All countries suffer the same damage: 
global emissions are the same for all; but a signatory in reducing more its emissions has lower 
benefits than a non-signatory. Consequently, a country which signs the agreement will always 
earn less than a country which does not. We can also show that this difference in payoff is 
decreasing with the size of the IEA. In other words, the larger the number of cooperating 
countries, the lower is the relative difference between a signatory and a non-signatory payoff. 
 
Contrary to the results established earlier in the literature, we find that signatories as non-
signatories reduce their GHG emissions. The effort of the coalition is not anymore (partly) 
cancelled by the decisions of the non-cooperating countries. However, a non-signatory will 
always have a higher welfare than a signatory. Under these conditions, the question is then 
what is the size of the stable IEA? 
 
4.2. The size of stable IEAs with strategic complementarities  
 
To determine how many countries will sign the agreement and how many will not in the first 
stage, we use the concept of internal and external stability. An IEA is said to be internally 
stable if none of its members wants to leave; on the opposite, an IEA is externally stable if 
none of the outsiders wants to join it. Formally, s* is an equilibrium participation level if it 
satisfies: 
) 1 * ( *) ( − ≥ s f s f ns s  and  ) 1 * ( *) ( + ≥ s f s f s ns . 
 
As Diamantoudi and al. (2006), we are interested in determining analytically the size of the 
stable agreement. In equalizing  ) 1 ( − s fns  and  ) (s f s , and allowing s to take non-integer 
values, it provides an analytical solution  s ~ . But we are interested in determining the largest   16
integer s* ≤  s ~ , such that it satisfies the internal and the external stability conditions (not 
necessarily with equality).  
Formally, we are looking for  s s ~ * ≤  such that  0 ) ~ ( ) 1 ~ ( = − − s f s f s ns . We find the 
following solution: 
) 1 2 ( 2




Δ + + − + + −
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With  ] 2 ) 4 3 ( 3 )[ 2 1 ( 4 )] 1 ( ) 5 2 ( [ 2 4 2 2 2 4 − + + − − − + − + + − = Δ n n n n m γ γ γ γ γ  > 0. 
 
The fifth result establishes the variations in the equilibrium number of signatories with respect 
to the number of countries concerned with the environmental problem and the perception they 
have of its seriousness. 
 
Result 5: 
Under our assumptions, there exists a unique stable IEA whose size only depends on n and γ: 
(i)  For any γ and n = 2, both countries are always better off in cooperating; 
(ii)  For n ≥ 3, if  n →
2 γ  (the most favourable condition), the stable coalition s* gets 
together between 50% and 75% of the countries concerned with the environmental 
problem; the larger is n, the most s* tends toward 50% of the countries. 
(iii)  For n ≥ 3, if  n 4
2 → γ (the perception of damages is very strong with respect to 
the perception of benefits), the stable coalition brings together only two or three 
countries. 
 
The stable agreement is the larger when the perception of damages is as low as possible. It 
also corresponds to the case in which countries pollute the most when there is no cooperation. 
When  n →
2 γ  cooperation is required (I1 is the biggest) and is established. Cooperation 
will always bring together more than half of the countries. Nonetheless it stays partial in the 
sense that beyond s*, it pays more to be a non-signatory than a signatory. It becomes too 
costly to reduce its emissions as much as the signatories.   
Given n, the stronger the parameter γ, the lower will be the equilibrium number of signatories. 
It can be explain by the fact that when policies are unilateral, the stronger is the perception of 
damages relative to benefits of emissions, the lower will be the individual emission level. 
Hence, cooperation is less attractive and the size of the stable agreement is smaller.   17
 
The last result establishes the environmental impact, in term of global emissions, of the 
cooperation between a subgroup of countries: 
 
Result 6: 
Under our assumptions, we show the following points: 







+ < γ , the environmental impact of the coalition is increasing 
in its size; 
(ii)  Beyond this threshold, the environmental impact of the coalition is decreasing in 
its size. 
 
If a subgroup of countries agrees to reduce their individual emissions, global emissions will 
decrease relative to the non-cooperative situation and all countries will gain of such a thing. In 
the most favourable case, cooperation can lead to a cut off of global emissions of 50%. 
However, the perception of damages with respect to the benefits of emissions must be below 
some level for the cooperation (even if partial) to have a real impact. If it is, we show that the 
reduction of global emissions relative to the non-cooperative case is increasing in the size of 
the coalition. When γ is beyond the threshold above-defined, the reverse result hold and the 
environmental impact of the stable coalition decrease with the equilibrium number of 
signatories. 
Depending on the parameter γ, this last result illustrates the cases when cooperation is needed 
and the cases when it is not. The institutions intended to address international problems then 
also vary: “Full cooperation is almost always desirable but rarely essential to the supply of 
environmental public goods” (Barrett, 2005). 
 
5.  Conclusions 
 
The results obtained under weak strategic complementarities between countries are a lot more 
optimistic than those observed still now in the literature (using the same game). In assuming 
that the efforts in abatement of a subset of countries are not partially cancelled by the 
countries outside, we show that a stable agreement exists and it can set together more than 
four countries.    18
Moreover, this coalition improves substantially the situation in view of unilateral policies. In 
implementing cooperation, the subgroup of countries also incites the non-signatories to abate 
their emissions.  
When environmental damages are perceived very seriously, cooperation and its impact are 
very low. This phenomenon is explained by the fact that individual emissions already tend 
toward the incompressible emission levels. Even if countries would decide to cooperate they 
could not abate below this threshold.  
With respect to the previous models, free riding is considered as the most important hindrance 
to international environmental cooperation. But, in postulating that countries’ strategies are 
substitute, this kind of behaviour is over weighting, yielding to a very low level of 
cooperation even in the most serious situations.  
When countries exhibit strategic complementarities, the free rider incentives always exist in 
the sense that it’s not the grand coalition that forms but an intermediate agreement. However, 
free-riding takes the form of a less important effort of abatement from non-signatories with 
respect to the effort of signatories. 
 
6.  Appendix 
 
The proofs of result 1, 2, 4 and 6 can be established by differentiation. 
 
Proof result 1:  
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Under our assumptions, the payoff function is concave which imply continuity of the best-
response function of each country. Moreover, the slope of the latter is always less than one on 










y x  
 Thus, it will cut only once the first axis and the equilibrium emission level for one country is 
unique. Finally, in differentiating  nc x  and  nc z  with respect to n and γ, we find:   19
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Proof result 2:  
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Proof result 3:  
To establish the first point we compute:  
0
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 and  0 ) ( < − = − nc c nc c x x n z z ; 
Then, being a signatory or a non-signatory, the damages a country bears is the same. Hence, 
nc c f f >  is evident from the preceding point; 
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Proof result 4:  
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The inequality  ns s f f <  is straightforward. 
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